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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, a new learning algorithm for adaptive network intrusion detection using naive Bayesian 
classifier and decision tree is presented, which performs balance detections and keeps false positives at 
acceptable level for different types of network attacks, and eliminates redundant attributes as well as 
contradictory examples from training data that make the detection model complex. The proposed 
algorithm also addresses some difficulties of data mining such as handling continuous attribute, dealing 
with missing attribute values, and reducing noise in training data. Due to the large volumes of security 
audit data as well as the complex and dynamic properties of intrusion behaviours, several data mining-
based intrusion detection techniques have been applied to network-based traffic data and host-based data 
in the last decades. However, there remain various issues needed to be examined towards current 
intrusion detection systems (IDS). We tested the performance of our proposed algorithm with existing 
learning algorithms by employing on the KDD99 benchmark intrusion detection dataset. The 
experimental results prove that the proposed algorithm achieved high detection rates (DR) and 
significant reduce false positives (FP) for different types of network intrusions using limited 
computational resources.  
KEYWORDS 
Decision Tree, Detection Rate, False Positive, Naive Bayesian classifier, Network Intrusion Detection   
1. INTRODUCTION 
An “Intrusion Detection System (IDS)” is a system for detecting intrusions that attempting to 
misuse the data or computing resources of a computer system. Mostly intrusions are the 
violation of information security policy. At first IDS was implemented for host-based that 
located in servers to examine the internal interfaces [1]-[3], but with the evolution of computer 
networks the focus gradually shifted toward network-based. Network intrusion detection system 
(NIDS) performs packet logging, real-time traffic analysis of IP network, and tries to discover if 
an intruder is attempting to break into the system [4]-[6]. Snort is an open source network 
intrusion detection and prevention system (NIDPS) developed by Sourcefire [7], [8]. Snort 
performs protocol analysis, content searching/matching, and commonly blocks a variety of 
intrusions such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, web application attacks, SMB probes, 
and OS fingerprinting attempts. Normally, intruders in computer system are classified into two 
categories like internal and external intruders. Internal intruders are users in the network and 
have some authority, but seek to gain additional ability to take action without legitimate 
authorization. External intruders do not have any authorized access to the system that they 
attack. Two types of detection models: misuse and anomaly are commonly using by IDS. 
Misuse detection model performs simple pattern matching techniques to match an attack pattern 
corresponding to known attack patterns in the database and produces very low false positives 
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(FP). Anomaly detection model identifies new attacks by analyzing the anomalous behaviors 
from normal behaviors [9], and achieves high detection rates (DR) for new attacks, but produces 
many false positives (FP). Anomaly based IDS generate rules by observing collected audit data 
that is the records of activities generated by the operating system. Currently adaptive intrusion 
detection aims to solve the problems of analyzing the huge volumes of audit data and realizing 
performance optimization of detection rules [10]-[14].              
Detecting intrusions using data mining algorithms such as decision tree (DT), naïve Bayesian 
(NB) [15], neural network (NN), support vector machine (SVM) [16], k-nearest neighbors 
(KNN), fuzzy logic model [17], and genetic algorithm [18] have been widely used in the last 
decades. However, there exist various problems in current IDS such as low detection accuracy, 
unbalanced detection rates for different types of attacks, high false positives, redundancy of 
input attributes as well as examples in the training data. Another difficulty of current IDS is to 
detect intrusions in real time high-speed networks, because the high-speed networks require IDS 
to deal with large volumes of network data in a very short time. In this paper, based on a 
comprehensive analysis for the current research challenges in intrusion detection, a new 
learning algorithm for adaptive network intrusion detection using naive Bayesian classifier and 
decision tree is presented, which can handle the above mentioned challenging issues. This paper 
also addresses some difficulties of data mining such as handling continuous attribute, dealing 
with missing attribute values, and reducing noise in training data. The experimental results by 
using KDD99 benchmark intrusion detection dataset prove that the proposed algorithm has 
achieved both high detection rates (DR) and the significant reduction of false positives (FP) in 
comparison with existing methods. 
The remainders of the paper are organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related overview of 
networking and intrusion detection. The basic problems of learning are discussed in Section 3, 
whereas our proposed algorithm is introduced in Section 4. Then, the experimental results are 
expressed in Section 5. Finally, our conclusions and future works are mentioned in Section 6. 
2. NETWORKING AND INTRUSION DETECTION OVERVIEW 
2.1. Networking Overview 
In the networks, TCP/IP is widely used for network communications, which are composed of 
four layers: application layer, transport layer, network layer, and hardware layer that work 
together [19]. When data transfers across the networks, the data passes from the highest layer 
through intermediate layers to the lowest layer. The lowest layer sends the accumulated data to 
its destination through the physical network. Application layer sends and receives data for 
particular applications, such as DNS, HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and SNMP. It enables applications to 
transfer data between server and client, and passes application data to the transport layer. 
Transport layer is responsible for packaging data using TCP (Transmission control protocol) 
and UDP (user datagram protocol) so that it can be transmitted between hosts. Each TCP or 
UDP packet has a source port and a destination port number. Network layer or internet protocol 
(IP) layer is in charge of handling the addressing and routing of data received from the transport 
layer. After the network layer has encapsulated the transport layer data, the resulting logical 
units are referred to as packets. Each packet contains a header, which is composed of various 
fields. Commonly used network layer protocols are IPv4, IPv6, ICMP (internet control message 
protocol), and IGMP (internet group management protocol). It is also responsible for providing 
error and status information involving the addressing and routing of data. Hardware layer or 
data link layer tackles communications on the physical network components including cables, 
routers, switches, and network interface cards (NIC). The best known hardware layer protocol is 
Ethernet. Ethernet relies on the concept of a media access control (MAC) address, which is a 
unique six-byte value (such as 00-02-B4-DA-92-2C) permanently assigned to a particular NIC.  
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2.2. Intrusion Detection Overview 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and analyzing the events in computer systems or 
networks to discover the signals of possible incidents, which attempt to compromise the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer resources. In general, IDS use misuse-
based and anomaly-based detection model for detecting intrusions. Misuse-based IDS are very 
effective for detecting known attacks but largely ineffective for detecting new attacks whose 
pattern has not stored in the database yet. It performs pattern matching to match an attack 
pattern corresponding to known attack patterns in the database. Anomaly-based IDS identify 
new attacks by analyzing anomalous behavior from normal behaviors. It has a relatively high 
detection rate for new attack, but produces many false positives. It uses profiles that are 
developed by monitoring the characteristics of typical activities over a period of time and then 
compares the characteristics of current activity to thresholds related to the profile. A network-
based IDS (NIDS) monitor and analyze network traffics, and use multiple sensors for detecting 
intrusions from internal and external networks [20]-[22]. IDS analyze the information gathered 
by the sensors, and return a synthesis of the input of the sensors to system administrator or 
intrusion prevention system. System administrator carries out the prescriptions controlled by the 
IDS. Today, data mining has become an indispensable tool for analyzing the input of the sensors 
in IDS. Fig. 1 shows a scenario of IDS to protect server machine from internal and external 
network. 
 
Figure 1.  A typical motivating scenario of intrusion detection. 
Ideally, IDS should have an attack detection rate (DR) of 100% along with false positive (FP) of 
0%. Nevertheless, in practice this is really hard to achieve. The most important parameters 
involved in the performance estimation of IDS are shown in Table 1.   
Table 1.  Parameters for performance estimation of IDS. 
Parameters Definition 
True Positive (TP) or Detection Rate (DR) Attack occur and alarm raised 
False Positive (FP) No attack but alarm raised 
True Negative (TN) No attack and no alarm 
False Negative (FN) Attack occur but no alarm 
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The metrics such as precision, recall, overall, and false alarm have been used to measure the 
performance of the data mining algorithm on the minority class [23]-[26]. From Table 1, 
precision, recall, and overall may be defined as follows.  
Precision = 
FPTP
TP
+
                    (1) 
Recall = 
FNTP
TP
+
              (2) 
Overall =  
TNFNFPTP
TNTP
+++
+
             (3) 
False Alarm =  
TNFNFPTP
FNFP
+++
+
            (4) 
Detection rate (DR) and false positive (FP) are used to estimate the performance of IDS [27], 
which are given as bellow:  
 DR = 100*
_
_det_
attacksTotal
attacksectedTotal
            (5) 
 FP = 100*
__
__
processnormalTotal
processedmisclassifTotal
           (6) 
2.3. Related Work 
In 1980, the concept of intrusion detection began with Anderson’s seminal paper [40]; he 
introduced a threat classification model that develops a security monitoring surveillance system 
based on detecting anomalies in user behavior. In 1986, Dr. Denning proposed several models 
for commercial IDS development based on statistics, Markov chains, time-series, etc [41]. In the 
early 1980’s, Stanford Research Institute (SRI) developed an Intrusion Detection Expert System 
(IDES) that monitors user behavior and detects suspicious events [42]. In 1988, a statistical 
anomaly-based IDS was proposed by Haystack [43], which used both user and group-based 
anomaly detection strategies. In 1996, Forrest et al. proposed an analogy between the human 
immune system and intrusion detection that involved analyzing a program’s system call 
sequences to build a normal profile [44]. In 2000, Valdes et al. [45] developed an anomaly 
based IDS that employed naïve Bayesian network to perform intrusion detecting on traffic 
bursts. In 2003, Kruegel et al. [46] proposed a multisensory fusion approach using Bayesian 
classifier for classification and suppression of false alarms that the outputs of different IDS 
sensors were aggregated to produce single alarm. In the same year, Shyu et al. [47] proposed an 
anomaly based intrusion detection scheme using principal components analysis (PCA), where 
PCA was applied to reduce the dimensionality of the audit data and arrive at a classifier that is a 
function of the principal components.  In 2003, Yeung et al. [2] proposed an anomaly based 
intrusion detection using hidden Markov models that computes the sample likelihood of an 
observed sequence using the forward or backward algorithm for identifying anomalous. Lee et 
al. [48] proposed classification based anomaly detection using inductive rules to characterize 
sequences occurring in normal data. In 2000, Dickerson at al. [49] developed the Fuzzy 
Intrusion Recognition Engine (FIRE) using fuzzy logic that process the network data and 
generate fuzzy sets for every observed feature and then the fuzzy sets are used to detect network 
attacks. In 2003, Ramadas et al. [50] presented the anomalous network traffic detection with self 
organizing maps using DNS and HTTP services that the neurons are trained with normal 
network traffic then real time network data is fed to the trained neurons, if the distance of the 
incoming network traffic is more than a preset threshold then it raises an alarm.  
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3. BASIC PROBLEMS OF LEARNING 
3.1. Handling Noise in Dataset 
Noise in the dataset is considered to be one of the most challenging issues in data mining. This 
is because the performance of the learning algorithms depends on the quality of dataset. The 
main idea of dealing with noisy data at the learning time is to avoid over-fitting the dataset. 
Noise handling can be carried out at different stages of rule induction and interpretation. The 
followings exhibit some typical noises being existed in the dataset. 
1) Missing attribute values: The simplest way for handling missing or unknown attribute 
value is to replace the missing attribute value with the most frequent attribute value in the 
dataset. Whereas, the most sophisticated way is to calculate the probability for attribute 
values and assign the probability value rather than the guessed value to each missing 
attribute value.  
2) Contradictory examples: The same examples appear more than once in the dataset with 
different class labels. Contradictory examples confuse the learning algorithms, so these 
examples should be avoided or labeled correctly before learning.   
3) Redundant examples: There often exist multiple copies of the same example in the 
dataset. Redundant examples are not a problem if they do not form contradictions, but 
this redundancy can change the decision trees produced by ID3 algorithm. For data 
mining, it’s better to remove redundancy by keeping only a unique example in the 
dataset. By doing so, it not only saves the space of storage in dataset but also speeds 
significantly up the learning process.  
4) Incomplete attribute problem: When the essential attributes of a problem are not used to 
describe in the dataset. Suppose to distinguish men from women based on the 
descriptions of a large group of people in terms of gender, height, weight, qualifications, 
and so on. The right attribute for men is “gender = male” and women is “gender = 
female”. If we cannot catch the right attribute, then the classification model will be more 
complex and less accurate.     
5) Misclassified examples: The examples in the dataset ware labeled with a wrong 
classification. 
3.2. Dealing with Continuous Attribute 
The goal of dealing with continuous attributes is to discretized the continuous attribute 
containing continuous values (i.e., real numbers or integers) into a number of intervals. The 
discretized intervals can be treated in a similar way to nominal values during learning and 
classification. It is very important for discretization of continuous attribute to find the right 
places to set up interval borders. The simplest technique is to place the interval borders of 
continuous attribute values between each adjacent pair of attribute values that are not classified 
into the same class. Suppose the pair of adjacent values on attribute Ai are Ai1 and Ai2, “A = 
(Ai1+Ai2)/2” can be taken as an interval border. The information gain technique adopted in ID3 
algorithm is another very efficient technique to find the most informative border to split the 
values of the continuous attribute. The maximum information gain is always considered for a 
cut point (the midpoint) between the values taken by two attribute values of different classes. 
Each value of the formula “A = (Ai +Ai+1)/2” where i = 1,…,n-1 is a possible cut point, if Ai and 
Ai+1 have been taken by different class values in the dataset. The purpose of employing 
information gain is to check each of the possible cut points and find the best split point. In C4.5 
algorithm, each of the possible cut points is not the midpoint between the two nearest values, 
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rather than the greatest value in the entire dataset that does not exceed the midpoint. The naïve 
Bayesian classifier also uses for discretization of continuous attribute values by constructing a 
probability curve for each class in the dataset. When the curves for every class have been 
constructed, interval borders are placed on each of those points where the leading curves are 
different from its two sides. A few other methods such as equal distance division, grouping, k-
nearest neighbors, and fuzzy borders are also applied to the continuous attributes for 
discretization. 
3.3. Input Attribute Selection from Dataset 
Effective input attribute selection from dataset before learning is very important, because 
irrelevant and redundant attributes of dataset may lead to complex classification model as well 
as reduce the classification accuracy [29]-[36]. In complex classification domains, input 
attributes of dataset may contain false correlations, which hamper the classification process. 
Some attributes in the dataset may be redundant, because the information they add is contained 
in other attributes. Also, some extra attributes can increase the computational time, and can have 
impact on the classification accuracy. Input attributes selection using data mining involves the 
selection of a subset of attributes d from a total of D original attributes of dataset, based on a 
given optimization principle that improves the performance of classifier. Finding a useful 
attribute subset is a form of search. Ideally, attribute selection methods search through the 
subsets of attributes, and try to find the best ones among the completing 2N candidate subsets 
according to some evaluation function. 
4. PROPOSED HYBRID ALGORITHM 
4.1. Proposed Learning Algorithm 
Given a training data D = {t1,…,tn} where ti = {ti1,…,tih} and the training data D contains the 
following attributes {A1, A2,…,An} and each attribute Ai contains the following attribute values 
{Ai1, Ai2,…,Aih}. The attribute values can be discrete or continuous. Also the training data D 
contains a set of classes C = {C1, C2,…,Cm}. Each example in the training data D has a 
particular class Cj. The algorithm first searches for the multiple copies of the same example in 
the training data D, if found then keeps only one unique example in the training data D (suppose 
all attribute values of two examples are equal then the examples are similar). Then the algorithm 
discreties the continuous attributes in the training data D by finding each adjacent pair of 
continuous attribute values that are not classified into the same class value for that continuous 
attribute. Next the algorithm calculates the prior P(Cj) and conditional P(Aij|Cj) probabilities in 
the training data D. The prior probability P(Cj) for each class is estimated by counting how 
often each class occurs in the training data D. For each attribute Ai the number of occurrences of 
each attribute value Aij can be counted to determine P(Ai). Similarly, the conditional probability 
P(Aij|Cj) for each attribute values Aij can be estimated by counting how often each attribute 
value occurs in the class in the training data D. Then the algorithm classifies all the examples in 
the training data D with these prior P(Cj) and conditional P(Aij|Cj) probabilities. For classifying 
the examples, the prior and conditional probabilities are used to make the prediction. This is 
done by combining the effects of the different attribute values from that example. Suppose the 
example ei has independent attribute values {Ai1, Ai2,…,Aip}, we know P(Aik | Cj), for each class 
Cj and attribute Aik. We then estimate P(ei | Cj) by     
    P(ei | Cj) = P(Cj) ∏k=1→p P(Aij | Cj)                      (7)  
To classify the example, the algorithm estimates the likelihood that ei is in each class. The 
probability that ei is in a class is the product of the conditional probabilities for each attribute 
value with prior probability for that class. The posterior probability P(Cj | ei) is then found for 
each class and the example classifies with the highest posterior probability for that example. 
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After classifying all the training examples, the class value for each example in training data D 
updates with Maximum Likelihood (ML) of posterior probability P(Cj|ei). 
    Cj = Ci→ PML(Cj|ei).              (8) 
Then again the algorithm calculates the prior P(Cj) and conditional P(Aij|Cj) probabilities using 
updated class values in the training data D, and again classifies all the examples of training data 
using these probabilities. If any of the training example is misclassified then the algorithm 
calculates the information gain for each attributes {A1, A2,…,An} in the training data D.  
  Info(D) = ∑
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  Information Gain (Ai) = Info(D)-Info(T)                   (11) 
And chooses one of the best attributes Ai among the attributes {A1, A2,…,An} from the training 
data D with highest information gain value, Then split the training data D into sub-datasets {D1, 
D2,…,Dn} depending on the chosen attribute values of Ai. After the algorithm estimates the prior 
and conditional probabilities for each sub-dataset Di = {D1, D2,…,Dn} and classifies the 
examples of each sub-dataset Di using their respective probabilities. If any example of any sub-
dataset Di is misclassified then the algorithm calculates the information gain of attributes for 
that sub-dataset Di, and chooses the best attribute Ai with maximum information gain value from 
sub-dataset Di, and split the sub-dataset Di into sub-sub-datasets Dij. Then again calculates the 
prior and conditional probabilities for each sub-sub-dataset Dij, and also classifies the examples 
of sub-sub-datasets using their respective probabilities. The algorithm will continue this process 
until all the examples of sub/sub-sub-datasets are correctly classified. When the algorithm 
correctly classifies all the examples then the prior and conditional probabilities for each datasets 
are preserved for future classification of unseen examples. The main procedure of proposed 
algorithm is described as follows. 
Algorithm   
Input: Training Data, D 
Output: Adaptive Intrusion Detection Model, AIDM 
Procedure:  
Step 1: Search the multiple copies of same example in D, if found then keeps only one unique 
example in D. 
Step 2: For each continuous attributes in D find the each adjacent pair of continuous attribute 
values that are not classified into the same class value for that continuous attribute 
Step 3: Calculate the prior probabilities P(Cj) and conditional probabilities P(Aij|Cj) in D. 
Step 4: Classify all the training examples using these prior and conditional probabilities, P(ei | 
Cj) = P(Cj) ∏k=1→p P(Aij | Cj). 
Step 5: Update the class value for each example in D with Maximum Likelihood (ML) of 
posterior probability, P(Cj|ei); Cj = Ci→ PML(Cj|ei). 
Step 6: Recalculate the prior P(Cj) and conditional P(Aij|Cj) probabilities using updated class 
values in D. 
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Step 7: Again classify all training examples in D using updated probability values. 
Step 8: If any training examples in D is misclassified then calculate the information gain for 
each attributes Ai = {A1, A2,…,An} in D using equation (11). 
Step 9: Choose the best attribute Ai from D with the maximum information gain value. 
Step 10: Split dataset D into sub-datasets {D1, D2,…,Dn} depending on the attribute values of Ai. 
Step 11: Calculate the prior P(Cj) and conditional P(Aij|Cj) probabilities of each sub-dataset Di. 
Step 12: Classify the examples of each sub-dataset Di with their respective prior and conditional 
probabilities. 
Step 13: If any example of any sub-dataset Di is misclassified then again calculate the 
information gain of attributes for that sub-dataset Di, and choose one of the best attribute Ai with 
maximum information gain, then split the sub-dataset Di into sub-sub-datasets Dij. Then again 
calculate the probabilities for each sub-sub-dataset Dij. Also classify the examples in sub-sub-
datasets using their respective probabilities. 
Step 14: Continue this process until all the examples are correctly classified. 
Step 15: Preserved all the prior and conditional probabilities for each dataset for future 
classification of unseen examples. 
5. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
5.1. KDD Cup 1999 Dataset 
The KDD cup 1999 dataset was used in the 3rd International Knowledge Discovery and Data 
Mining Tools Competition for building a network intrusion detector, a predictive model capable 
of distinguishing between intrusions and normal connections [37]. In 1998, DARPA intrusion 
detection evaluation program, a simulated environment was set up to acquire raw TCP/IP dump 
data for a local-area network (LAN) by the MIT Lincoln Lab to compare the performance of 
various intrusion detection methods. It was operated like a real environment, but being blasted 
with multiple intrusion attacks and received much attention in the research community of 
adaptive intrusion detection. The KDD99 dataset contest uses a version of DARPA98 dataset. In 
KDD99 dataset, each example represents attribute values of a class in the network data flow, 
and each class is labelled either normal or attack. The classes in KDD99 dataset can be 
categorized into five main classes (one normal class and four main intrusion classes: probe, 
DOS, U2R, and R2L). 
1) Normal connections are generated by simulated daily user behaviour such as downloading 
files, visiting web pages. 
2) Denial of Service (DoS) attack causes the computing power or memory of a victim machine 
too busy or too full to handle legitimate requests. DoS attacks are classified based on the 
services that an attacker renders unavailable to legitimate users like apache2, land, mail bomb, 
back, etc. 
3) Remote to User (R2L) is an attack that a remote user gains access of a local user/account by 
sending packets to a machine over a network communication, which include send-mail, and 
Xlock.   
4) User to Root (U2R) is an attack that an intruder begins with the access of a normal user 
account and then becomes a root-user by exploiting various vulnerabilities of the system. Most 
common exploits of U2R attacks are regular buffer-overflows, load-module, Fd-format, and 
Ffb-config.   
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5) Probing (Probe) is an attack that scans a network to gather information or find known 
vulnerabilities. An intruder with a map of machines and services that are available on a network 
can use the information to look for exploits. 
In KDD99 dataset these four attacks (DoS, U2R, R2L, and probe) are divided into 22 different 
attacks that tabulated in Table 2.  
Table 2.  Different Types of attacks in KDD99 Dataset. 
4 Main Attack Classes 22 Attacks Classes 
Denial of Service (DoS) back, land, neptune, pod, smurt, teardrop 
Remote to User (R2L) ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap, multihop, phf, spy, 
warezclient, warezmaster 
User to Root (U2R) buffer_overflow, perl, loadmodule, rootkit 
Probing ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan 
There are total 41 input attributes in KDD99 dataset for each network connection that have 
either discrete or continuous values and divided into three groups. The first group of attributes is 
the basic features of network connection, which include the duration, prototype, service, number 
of bytes from source IP addresses or from destination IP addresses, and some flags in TCP 
connections. The second group of attributes in KDD99 is composed of the content features of 
network connections and the third group is composed of the statistical features that are 
computed either by a time window or a window of certain kind of connections. The list of the 
input attributes in KDD99 dataset for each network connections is shown in the Table 3. 
Table 3.  Input attributes in KDD99 Dataset. 
No Input Attribute Type No Input Attribute Type 
1 Duration Con. 22 is_guest_login Dis. 
2 protocol_type Dis. 23 Count Con. 
3 Service Dis. 24 srv_count Con. 
4 Flag Dis. 25 serror_rate Con. 
5 src_bytes Con. 26 srv_serror_rate Con. 
6 dst_bytes Con. 27 rerror_rate Con. 
7 Land Dis. 28 srv_rerror_rate Con. 
8 wrong_fragment Con. 29 same_srv_rate Con. 
9 Urgent Con. 30 diff_srv_rate Con. 
10 Hot Con. 31 srv_diff_host_rate Con. 
11 num_failed_logins Con. 32 dst_host_count Con. 
12 logged_in Dis. 33 dst_host_srv_count Con. 
13 num_compromised Con. 34 dst_host_same_srv_rate Con. 
14 root_shell Con. 35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate Con. 
15 su_attempted Con. 36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate Con. 
16 num_root Con. 37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate Con. 
17 num_file_creations Con. 38 dst_host_serror_rate Con. 
18 num_shells Con. 39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate Con. 
19 num_access_files Con. 40 dst_host_rerror_rate Con. 
20 num_outbound_cmds Con. 41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate Con. 
21 is_host_login Dis. - - - 
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Table 4 shows the number of examples in 10% training and testing data of KDD99 dataset.  
Table 4.  Number of training and testing examples in KDD99 Dataset. 
Attack Types Training Examples Testing Examples 
Normal 97277 60592 
Denial of Service 391458 237594 
Remote to User 1126 8606 
User to Root 52 70 
Probing 4107 4166 
Total Examples 494020 311028 
 
5.2. Experimental Analysis 
In order to evaluate the performance of proposed algorithm for network intrusion detection, we 
performed 5-class classification using KDD99 intrusion detection benchmark dataset. All 
experiments were performed using an Intel Core 2 Duo Processor 2.0 GHz processor (2 MB 
Cache, 800 MHz FSB) with 1 GB of RAM. The results of the comparison of proposed 
algorithm with ID3 and with naive Bayesian classifier are in Table 5 and Table 6.   
Table 5.  Comparison of the results using 41 attributes. 
Method Normal Probe DOS U2R R2L 
Proposed Algorithm (DR %) 99.72 99.25 99.75 99.20 99.26 
Proposed Algorithm (FP %) 0.06 0.39 0.04 0.11 6.81 
Naïve Bayesian (DR %) 99.27 99.11 99.69 64.00 99.11 
Naïve Bayesian (FP %) 0.08 0.45 0.04 0.14 8.02 
ID3 (DR %) 99.63 97.85 99.51 49.21 92.75 
ID3 (FP %) 0.10 0.55 0.04 0.14 10.03 
Table 6.  Comparison of the results using 19 attributes. 
Method Normal Probe DOS U2R R2L 
Proposed Algorithm (DR %) 99.84 99.75 99.76 99.47 99.35 
Proposed Algorithm (FP %) 0.05 0.28 0.03 0.10 6.22 
Naïve Bayesian (DR %) 99.65 99.35 99.71 64.84 99.15 
Naïve Bayesian (FP %) 0.05 0.32 0.04 0.12 6.87 
ID3 (DR %) 99.71 98.22 99.63 86.11 97.79 
ID3 (FP %) 0.06 0.51 0.04 0.12 7.34 
We tested the performance of proposed algorithm using the reduced dataset of 12 attributes and 
17 attributes in KDD99 dataset, which increase the detection rate for intrusion classes that are 
summarized in Table 7.  
Table 7.  Performance of proposed algorithm using reduced dataset. 
Class Value 12 Attributes 17 Attributes 
Normal 99.98 99.95 
Probe 99.92 99.93 
DoS 99.99 99.97 
U2R 99,38 99.46 
R2L 99.55 99.69 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
This paper introduced a new hybrid learning algorithm for adaptive network intrusion detection 
using naive Bayesian classifier and ID3 algorithm, which analyzes the large volume of network 
data and considers the complex properties of attack behaviours to improve the performance of 
detection speed and detection accuracy. In this paper we have concentrated on the development 
of the performance of naïve Bayesian classifier and ID3 algorithm. It has been successfully 
tested that this hybrid algorithm minimized false positives, as well as maximize balance 
detection rates on the 5 classes of KDD99 benchmark dataset. The attacks of KDD99 dataset 
detected with 99% accuracy using proposed algorithm. The future work focus on improving the 
false positives of remote to user (R2L) attack and apply this detection model into real world 
IDS.  
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